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AN HMO DOES NOT OWE AN ERISA
FIDUCIARY DUTY TO ITS EMPLOYEE
BENEFICIARIES: AFTER PEGRAM V.
HERDRICH, WHO WILL SPEAK FOR
THE WORKING CLASS?
L.

DARNELL WEEDEN*

INTRODUCTION

In the past few decades an American health care system once
defined by fee-for-service care has succumbed to domination by
large, for-profit managed care organizations.! The corollary of this
national shift in health care has been a major transfer of financial
and administrative power from doctors and hospitals to insurers
and Health Management Organizations ("HMOs").2 Critics of the
current system believe this shift in power has given managed care

* Professor, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University; B.A.,
J.D., University of Mississippi.
l. David H. Johnson, ERISA Fiduciary Duty Claims and Managed Care Liability:
Implications of Herdrich v. Pegram, 11 HEALTH L., May 1999, at 1, l. "The current
market power of managed care signals a major shift of both financial and administrative
power away from physicians and hospitals to manage care organizations." Id. Johnson
believes doctors still exercise considerable authority to control medical care, but that
doctors' medical care authority is significantly compromised. Id. A key provision of
managed care is the transfer of financial risk for the provision of medical services for an
assigned group of patients to physicians, medical groups, and other provider organiza
tions. Id. "This assumption of financial risk for patient care by [doctors] charged with
responsibility for delivering that care is at the heart of the public debate around man
aged care." Id.
2. See Raphael O. Boyd, HMO Liability: An Analysis of Patients' Legal Rights,
NAT'L BAR ASS'N MAG., Oct.lNov. 2000, at 27, 28.
HMO's began requiring physician's [sic] to obtain approval for treatments
prior to providing the care. This is called the prospective utilization review.
The process normally requires treatment and hospitalization requests by phy
sicians to be approved by an HMO review board prior to the patient receiving
the treatment. HMO review boards then made recommendations as to what
treatment the HMO would or would not reimburse. If the HMO chooses not
to reimburse for treatment, the patient may still decide to proceed with the
treatment. However, the patient would have to pay for the care. Utilizing the
prospective utilization process, HMOs have been able to save billions of dol
lars in health care expenditures and have become very profitable.
Id. at 28.
381
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organizations control over the direction and disposition of medical
treatment because of their perceived undue influence on the pock
etbooks of health care professionals. 3 Lawyers and policyrriakers
on both sides of the managed care/health care debate are also'sensi
tive to the growing resentment in the media and the public for the
perceived substitution of economics for the Hippocratic Oath that
once served as the cornerstone of medical care. 4 The debate re
flects a popular fear that, under the managed care system, doctors
may be forced to choose between enhancing patient welfare and
enhancing their own financial wellbeing through economic incen
tives associated with reduced patient care. 5 This creates a signifi
cant problem of accountability from the public's perspective. If
doctors choose the latter option and patient care suffers as a result,
what methods of redress are available?
Most Americans today participate in health care plans pro
vided by their employers. For these individuals, there will be few, if
any, avenues of relief for substandard treatment they may receive
as a result of the current health care regime. This is because, as an
employment-related benefit, their health plans are governed by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").6
ERISA is a statutory plan that regulates all "private employee ben
efits plans, including both pension plans and welfare plans."7 A
"welfare plan" includes "any plan, fund, or program" maintained
for the purpose of providing medical or other health benefits for
employees or their beneficiaries "through the purchase of insurance
or otherwise."8 Because ERISA may preempt state law claims of
medical malpractice, negligence, and other medical torts, individu
als receiving health care coverage through their employers may be
forced to resolve their health care grievances under the procedures
set forth in the statute for a breach of fiduciary duty.
3. William T. Robinson, III, New Deep Pocket: Managed Care Entity Liability for
Alleged Improper Denial of Access, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 357 (1997).
Managed health care has grown exponentially in recent years. The for-profit
tempo of changes in the managed care field and the inter-relationship of orga
nizations and professionals providing medical care services in and through or
ganizations have an overriding or dominant rhythm that seems, like the
rhythm of the business world, to permeate all decisions.
[d. at 357.
4. Id.
5. Johnson, supra note 1, at 1.
6. 29 U.S.c. § 1001 (1994).
7. Dist. of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 127 (1992).
8. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 222-23 (2000) (quoting 29 U.S.c.
§ 1002(1)(A) (1994».
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An employee may state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty
under ERISA by alleging the following facts in the complaint: (1)
that the defendants are plan fiduciaries; (2) that the defendants
breached their fiduciary duties; and (3) that a cognizable loss re
sulted. 9 In Pegram v. Herdrich, the Supreme Court recently ex
pounded upon the requirements one must meet in order to prove
that an HMO breached its fiduciary duty.lO The Supreme Court
ruled that the initial inquiry in cases alleging such a breach is
whether adverse, mixed eligibility, and treatment decisions l l made
by an HMO's physicians are fiduciary acts under ERISA.n In
cases alleging breach of an ERISA fiduciary duty, a closely related
question is whether the decision-maker was under a fiduciary duty
while forming an adverse decision.13
Whether an HMO is a fiduciary under ERISA when it acts
through its physicians depends on some background of fact and law
about HMOs and medical benefit plans.14 In the United States,
physicians have traditionally provided care on a "fee-for-service"
basis.Is A physician would charge a fee for a general exam or a
medical procedure and then bill the patient for the services pro
vided. If the patient had insurance, the doctor would submit the bill
for the patient's care directly to the insurer. 16 Under such fee-for
service systems, as long as doctors continued to receive payments, a
financial incentive existed for doctors to provide as much care as
possibleY The only check on this "more care incentive" was a phy
sician's duty to exercise reasonable medical skill and judgment in
the patient's interest. Is
In the late 1960s, insurers and others developed the HMO as a
new model for health care delivery.19
The defining feature of an HMO is receipt of a fixed fee for each
patient enrolled under the terms of a contract to provide speci
9. See 29 U.S.C. § ll04(a) (1994) (outlining the standard of care with respect to
fiduciary duties).
10. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 222-23.
11. See infra note 33 and accompanying text for a discussion of eligibility
decisions.
12. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 222-26.
13. Id. at 226.
14. Id. at 218.
15.
16.
17.
18.

19.

Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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fied health care if needed. The HMO thus assumes the financial
risk of providing the benefits promised: if a participant never gets
sick, the HMO keeps the money regardless, and if a participant
becomes expensively ill, the HMO is responsible for the treat
ment agreed upon even if its cost exceeds the participant's
premiums. 2o
HMOs, unlike doctors in the fee-for-service system, take steps to
control costs because they are not passed on to the patient. To this
extent, HMOs make coverage determinations by scrutinizing re
quested services against the contractual provisions with the em
ployer plan sponsor. This is to ensure "that a request for care falls
within the scope of covered circumstances [e.g., pregnancy] or that
a given treatment falls within the scope of the care promised [e.g.,
surgery]."21 HMOs also issue general guidelines informed by finan
cial considerations to their physicians about appropriate levels of
care. 22 Unlike the fee-for-service system, a physician's financial in
terest under an HMO plan "lies in providing less care, not more."23
The balancing mechanism against an HMO's influence is the physi
cian's professional obligation to provide covered services with a
reasonable degree of skill. 24
HMOs originally gained popularity as the perception grew that
fee-for-service physicians were providing unnecessary or useless
services at great expense. 25 Now many doctors argue that HMOs
often sacrifice the patient's individual needs to improve the finan
cial status of the HMO.26 One method commonly used by HMOs
to reduce expenses is to provide "specific financial incentives" to
doctors for reducing the use of health care treatment. 27
In Pegram, the Supreme Court discussed the nature of pure
20. Id. at 218-19.
21. Id. at 219.
22. Id.; see also RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 543-69 (1997) (discussing the modern managed care system in
the United States).
23. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 219.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 220.
26. Id. (citing Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 375-78 (7th Cir. 1998) for various
criticisms of HMO practices); see also John P. Little, D.M.D., Note, Managed Care
Contracts of Adhesion: Terminating the Doctor-Patient Relationship and Endangering
Patient Health, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1397, 1399-1400 (1997) (arguing that, because of
their overly broad concern with increasing their profit margins, HMOs are to blame for
inadequate medical treatment and the erosion of the doctor-patient relationship).
27. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 219 (listing such incentives as rewarding physicians for
using fewer HMO services and penalizing them for over-using treatments).
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eligibility decisions, pure treatment decisions, and "mixed eligibility
and treatment" decisions. 28 Pure eligibility decisions are based on a
plan's coverage of a specific medical procedure or treatment for a
medical condition. 29 By comparison, pure treatment decisions are
choices about the diagnosis and substantive treatment of a patient's
condition. 3D Using the pure treatment decision, the physician eval
uates a patient's symptoms and makes an educated guess about
both the origin of the symptoms and the proper course of treat
ment. 31 In practice, "eligibility decisions cannot be untangled from
physicians' judgments about reasonable medical treatment ...."32
When eligibility decisions are embroiled with treatment decisions,
they are referred to a.s mixed eligibility and treatment decisions. 33
The Pegram Court, recognizing that Congress imposed a flexi
ble duty of loyalty on individuals administering ERISA plans, held
that HMO owner-doctors34 do not act as fiduciaries when treating
patients and making determinations about what types of injuries or
illnesses are covered by their respective plans. 35 The same fiduciary
principles articulated in Pegram apply to all doctors working for
HMOs, regardless of whether or not they own the HMO.36 As a
result of Pegram, HMO owner-doctors can join other doctors who
do not own HMOs in ignoring the single duty of loyalty to the ben
eficiary, which is imposed on a common law trustee. 37 Because of a
lack of the single-duty, fiduciary loyalty imposed on a common law
trustee, a doctor's financial self-interests may influence his decision
/d. at 228-29.
Id. at 228.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 229.
Id.
The kinds of decisions mentioned in Herdrich's ERISA count ... are ...
mixed eligibility and treatment decisions: physicians' conclusions about when
to use diagnostic tests; about seeking consultations and making referrals to
physicians and [other] facilities; about proper standards of care, the experi
mental character of a proposed course of treatment, the reasonableness of a
certain treatment, and the emergency character of a medical condition.
Id. at 229-30.
34. See id. at 211. Owner-doctors are physicians who have formed their own
HMOs. These HMOs "function as a health maintenance organization (HMO) organ
ized for profit. Its owners are physicians providing prepaid medical services to partici
pants whose employers contract with [it] to provide such coverage." Id. at 215.
35. Id. at 237.
36. [d. at 220-22.
37. [d. at 222 ("We think, then, that courts are not in a position to derive a sound
legal principle to differentiate [a physician-owned] HMO ... from other HMOs.").

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
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making; HMOs are thus insulated from lawsuits at the expense of
patients' rights. 38
According to the Pegram Court, all HMOs are relieved of the
ordinary duties owed by common law trustees because Congress
never intended for an HMO to be characterized as a fiduciary to
the extent that its physicians make mixed eligibility decisions. 39
Congress did not consider a mixed eligibility decision-maker as a
fiduciary, according to the Supreme Court. 40 The common law
trustee's primary concern has traditionally "been the payment of
money in the interest of the beneficiary."41 The Supreme Court
reasoned that because a doctor making a mixed eligibility treatment
decision served a completely different role from that of the com
mon law trustee those decisions are not fiduciary.42 Private trustees
do not make treatment judgments of any kind, while physicians
working for HMOs must make numerous mixed treatment judg
ments daily.43 The mixed treatment medical settings "bear no more
resemblance to trust departments than a decision to operate [on a
patient] turns on the factors controlling the amount of a quarterly
income distribution."44 The Court rejected the application of the
common law fiduciary relationship to an HMO physician's mixed
eligibility and treatment decisions because such an application
would have the unthinkable consequence of denying HMOs any
profit for failing "to act solely in the interest of the patient without
possibility of conflict."45
Because it is important that the public maintain confidence in
the medical profession and the current health care system, it is not
only proper but also necessary for Congress to amend ERISA to
provide for patient relief. An amended ERISA should use tradi
tional common law liability concepts of torts, contracts, and trusts
to restore quality patient care consistent with the Hippocratic Oath
serving as the bottom line. 46
38. [d. at 225 ("Under ERISA, however, a fiduciary may have financial interests
adverse to beneficiaries.").
39. [d. at 231.
40.
41.
42.

[d.
[d.
/d. at 231-32.
[d. at 232.
[d.
Id. at 233.
Robinson, supra note 3, at 357 (noting that the plaintiff bar has used ex

43.
44.
45.
46.
panded traditional liability concepts with limited success as an attack against managed
care providers).
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One commentator is concerned that an amended ERISA
would impose increased liability on physicians and ultimately lead
to higher medical costs for the consumer-patient, as well as in
creased malpractice costs for the managed care industry.47 Oppo
nents of an amended ERISA also argue that any ERISA
amendment that expands the potential medical liability of doctors.
and other managed care providers could lead to the collapse of a
system already burdened with increased medical costS.48 However,
any increased costs associated with amending ERISA are out
weighed by authorizing plaintiffs to recover damages resulting from
negligent medical treatment from managed care organizations and
their employees. 49 When plaintiffs are left without a remedy for
their medical malpractice claims because of ERISA's preemption, it
is simply viewed as an unfortunate consequence of preemption. 50
The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that Congress
should amend ERISA to allow plan beneficiaries/patients to assert
medical malpractice claims and breaches of both fiduciary duty and
contract against both doctors and HMOs in the managed care in
dustry. Part I of this Article will begin by presenting the germane
facts of Pegram. 51 It will then analyze the Seventh Circuit's deci
sion that ERISA does create a fiduciary duty for HMOs handling
47. J. Scott Andersen, Is Utilization Review the Practice of Medicine?, 19 J. LE.
GAL MED. 431, 432 (1998).
48. Id. at 431 ("The American system of health care is at a crossroads. The sys
tem is on the verge of collapsing under the weight of increased spending which ... will
dwarf the nation's defense budget and will comprise nearly 18% of the United States
gross national product.") (citing Leonard A. Hagen, Physician Credentialing: Economic
Criteria Compete with the Hippocratic Oath, 31 GONZ. L. REV. 427, 429 (1995-96».
49. James P. Duffy, IV, HMO Doctors as ERISA Fiduciaries: A Bankruptcy Per
spective, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 125,149 (2000) ("The inability to collect personal
damages is exacerbated by the fact that plaintiffs may not have a state law cause of
action against HMO doctors who act negligently because of ERISA's broad preemptive
powers. ").
50. Id. at 150.
There is little doubt that present healthcare procedures give doctors incentives
to act in a self-serving manner. It is also clear that these HMO practices often
conflict with the statutory goals of ERISA. This suggests that Congress should
revisit and revise ERISA to reflect current health care practices. Moreover,
holding HMO doctors liable as ERISA fiduciaries creates the potential for
damage awards which physicians could not bear. Many HMO doctors would
be forced into bankruptcy by these awards. Many more physician partnerships
could follow suit. There is no clear answer to this problem. Plaintiffs have
legitimate concerns; however, physician bankruptcy may not be the best re
sponse. In the end, the question of whether HMO doctors may be ERISA
fiduciaries is best left for Congress to decide.
Id.
51. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
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mixed eligibility and treatment decisions. Part II of the Article will
examine the Supreme Court's rationale for reversing the Seventh
Circuit in holding that, the mixed decisions of HMO owner-doctors
do not raise a fiduciary issue under ERISA. Part II will then dis
cuss the impact of the Court's decision and the method of analysis
on managed care issues under ERISA. The Article will conclude,
in Part III, with the Author's recommendation that Congress
amend ERISA to provide increased protection for plan benefi
ciaries asserting health care rights against HMOs.
I.

A.

SEVENTH CIRCUIT TANGLES WITH PEGRAM ISSUES: FINDING
THE HMO's DECISION WAS FIDUCIARY

Facts

Through her husband's employer, Cynthia Herdrich ("Her
drich") participated in a pre-paid health insurance plan (the
"Plan") operated by Carle Clinic Association, P.e. ("Carle"),
Health Alliance Medical Plans, Inc. ("HAMP"), and Carle Health
Insurance Management Company, Inc. 52 On October 21, 1992,
Herdrich filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of McLean County,
Illinois, charging Carle and Lori Pegram, M.D. ("Dr. Pegram") with
medical negligence. 53 Specifically, Herdrich alleged that she had
suffered a ruptured appendix and contracted peritonitis due to the
defendants' "negligence in failing to provide her with timely and
adequate medical care. "54 Herdrich amended her complaint on
February 18, 1994, to add two counts (Counts III and IV) of state
law fraud against Carle and HAMP.55 Count III alleged that Carle
fail[ ed] to disclose certain material facts regarding the ownership
of RAMP, as well as fail[ed] to advise her that the compensation
of plan physicians was increased to the extent that they did not
order diagnostic tests, utilized facilities owned by those physi
cians, and did not make emergency or consultation referrals.
Count IV alleged that RAMP breached its duty of good faith and
Id. at 365.
Id.
54. Id. at 365 n.t. On March 7, 1991, Dr. Pegram discovered an enlarged mass,
later determined to be the appendix, in Herdrich's abdomen. Id. Due to Carle's policy
requiring plan participants to receive treatment at Carle-staffed facilities in non-emer
gency situations, Dr. Pegram waited for more than a week before obtaining an ultra
sound that would determine the nature, size, and location of the mass. Id. During this
waiting period, Herdrich's condition declined and her appendix ruptured, eventually
resulting in the onset of peritonitis. Id.
55. Id. at 366.
52.
53.
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fair dealing by increasing its profits and the profits of its con
tracted physicians through minimizing the use of diagnostic tests,
emergency consultation referrals, and facilities not owned by
such physicians, all to the detriment of plan beneficiaries. 56

Subsequent to the amendment, defendants removed the case
to federal court, asserting that the two new counts were preempted
by ERISAY Defendants then filed a motion for summary judg
ment as to Counts III and IV only.58 The court granted the motion
with respect to Count IV, because Herdrich was seeking monetary
damages where ERISA authorized only equitable relief. 59 The trial
judge denied summary judgment on Count III, but concluded that
ERISA preempted the claim under Count 111. 60 Accordingly, the
trial judge gave Herdrich leave to amend this count so as to more
fully state her basis for proceeding under ERISA.61 Herdrich's
amended Count III alleged that the "defendants breached their fi
duciary duty to plan beneficiaries by depriving them of proper med
ical care and retaining the savings resulting therefrom for
themselves."62 The defendants then moved to dismiss Herdrich's
amended Count III for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. 63
"The case-including the defendants' motion to dismiss-was
assigned to a magistrate judge, who recommended that the
amended count III be dismissed" because Herdrich failed to iden
tify how any of the named defendants acted as a fiduciary to the
Plan. 64 Herdrich filed an objection to the magistrate's recommen
dation, which was denied by the district court on April 15, 1996. 65
Counts I and II were tried in early December 1996.66 The jury re
turned a verdict in Herdrich's favor on both counts, awarding her
$35,000 in compensatory damages. 67
Herdrich appealed the district court's dismissal of her amended
56. Id. at 366 n.2.
57. Id. at 366.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 366-67 & n.3.
63. Id. at 367. In recommending that the amended count be dismissed, the court
stated that Herdrich was not entitled to any relief under Count III because she failed
"to identify how any of the defendants is involved as a fiduciary to the plan." Id.
64. Id.
65. /d.
66. /d.
67. /d.
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Count III to the Seventh Circuit, contending that her complaint suf
ficiently stated "a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ER
ISA."68 The defendants, in turn, argued that the Seventh Circuit
lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because Herdrich did not "file a
timely notice of appeal."69 Defendants also challenged Herdrich's
damages request, arguing that beneficiaries of ERISA plans cannot
recover "anything other than the benefits provided expressly in the
pl~n."70 Though addressing each of defendants' arguments at
length, the Seventh Circuit focused primarily on the issue raised by
Herdrich: whether her pleadings sufficiently alleged that (1) the de
fendants were plan fiduciaries, (2) "the defendants breached their
fiduciary duties," and (3) "a cognizable loss resulted."71 ·The re
mainder of Part I will explore the Seventh Circuit's analysis of these
three elements, which are necessary to state a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty under ERISA.72

B.

The Seventh Circuit's Decision
1. . Defendants as Plan Fiduciaries

The Seventh Circuit rejected the magistrate's contention,
adopted by the district court in its dismissal of Count III, that Her
drich failed to allege how the named defendants acted as fiduciaries
to the Plan.73 In reaching this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit
looked to both the plain language and legislative history of ER
ISA.74 The court focused specifically on 29 U.S.c. § 1002(21)(A):
Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), a person
is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises
any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting
management of such plan or exercises any authority of [sic] con
trolrespecting management or disposition of its assets ... or (iii)
he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility
in the administration of such plan.75

The court also noted that Congress, when enacting ERISA,
68.
69.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 369-80.
Id. at 369; 29 U.S.c. § 1l04(a) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
Pegram, 154 F.3d at 369.
Id. at 369-70.
Id. at 369-70 (quoting 29 U.S.c. § 1002(21)(A) (1994».
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tended that the definition of "fiduciary" be broadly interpreted.?6
Evaluating Herdrich's amended Count III in light of this statu
tory language and history, the court concluded that the amended
complaint sufficiently identified defendants as plan fiduciaries.?7
The court considered Herdrich's allegation that the "defendants
have the exclusive right to decide all disputed and non-routine
claims under the plan" as evidencing the "discretionary control and
authority" required of a fiduciary under ERISA.78 The court also
noted that the Plan's physicians comprised the entire board of di
rectors, enabling them to control every aspect of the Plan's govern
ance. 79 On the basis of this infrastructure, the court found it
reasonable to infer that Carle and HAMP were plan fiduciaries. 80
2.

Defendants' Breach of Fiduciary Duty·

After determining that the defendants were in fact plan -fidltci
aries, the court went on to conclude that Herdrich's complaint suffi
ciently alleged a breach of the defendants' fiduciary duties. 81
Again, the court reached this conclusion by reference to ERISA's
statutory language. 82 In accordance with 29 U.S.c. § l104(a)(1), a
plan fiduciary "shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan
solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries. "83 There
fore, an ERISA fiduciary that acts in its own interests breaches its
76. Id. at 370. The Chairman of the House Committee on Education and Labor
stated:
The Committee has adopted the view that the definition of fiduciary is of ne
cessity broad .... A fiduciary need not be a person with direct access to the
assets of the plan .... Conduct alone may in an appropriate circumstance
impose fiduciary obligations. It is the clear intention of the Committee that
any person with a specific duty imposed upon him by this statute be deemed to
be a fiduciary . . . .
.
120 CONGo REC. 3977, 3983 (Feb. 25, 1974) reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 3293. The.Seventh Circuit
also noted that, in accordance with this expressed congressional intent, courts routinely
construe "fiduciary" broadly under ERISA and emphasize "the importance of discre
tionary control and authority." Pegram, 154 F.3d at 370.
77. Pegram, 154 F.3d at 370-71.
78. Id. at 370.
79. /d.
80. /d.
81. . Id. at 371.
82. Id.
83. /d. The law also requires an ERISA fiduciary to discharge his duties "for the
exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan; (B) with the care ... that a
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use ...." 29
U.S.c. § 1l04(a)(1) (1994).

392
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duty of care. 84
As noted by the Seventh Circuit, the ERISA fiduciary duty is
aimed at managed care incentive schemes "tainted by a conflict of
interest," like the ones involved in Pegram 85 and Shea v. Esensten. 86
In Shea, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the defendants breached
their fiduciary duty by failing to disclose to plan participants that
they provided financial incentives to physicians who reduced the
number of tests and referrals offered to patients. 87 Following the
lead of the Eighth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit in Pegram stated that
the defendants' infrastructure, which permitted the Plan's physi
cians to also act as its administrators, at least facially violated its
fiduciary duty.88 This dual role vested the doctor-owners with the
authority to determine which claims would be paid, as well as the
nature and duration of patients' care-expenditures that would di
rectly affect the physicians' own year-end bonuses. 89 The existence
of a direct correlation between the amount of money spent on tests
and treatment and the amount received by physicians in the form of
bonuses led the court to infer that the defendants' discharge of their
fiduciary duties was colored by an incentive to minimize costS.90
The Seventh Circuit, recognizing that a "fiduciary's covert
profiteering at the expense of insureds is inconsistent with its duties
of acting 'solely in the interest of the participants and benefi
ciaries,"'91 held that incentive schemes can, under certain circum
84. Pegram, 154 F.3d at 371 (citing JAMES F. JORDEN ET AL., HANDBOOK ON
ERISA LITIGATION § 3.03[A], at 3-53 (1994)).
85. Id. (quoting Lowen v. Tower Asset Mgmt., Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1213 (2d Cir.
1987)).
86. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
87. Id. at 628-29.
88. 154 F.3d at 380.
89. Id. at 372.
90. Id. at 372-73.
91. Id. at 372 (citing Reis v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 1995 WL 669583, at *7
(N.D. Ill. 1995)).
Drawing parallels to [Reis v. Humana Health Plan, Inc.], Herdrich sets forth,
in the amended third count of her complaint, the intricacies of the defendants'
incentive structure. The Plan dictated that the very same HMO administrators
vested with the authority to determine whether health care claims would be
paid, and the type, nature, and duration of care to be given, were those physi
cians who became eligible to receive year-end bonuses as a result of cost-sav
ings. Because the physician/administrators' year-end bonuses were based on
the difference between total plan costs (i.e., the costs of providing medical
services) and revenues (i.e., payments by plan beneficiaries), an incentive ex
isted for them to limit treatment and, in turn, HMO costs so as to ensure
larger bonuses. With a jaundiced eye focused firmly on year-end bonuses, it is
not unrealistic to assume that the doctors rendering care under the Plan were

2002]

HMOs AND ERISA AFTER PEGRAM V. HERDRICH

393

stances, trigger a breach of the ERISA fiduciary duty.92 In so
ruling, the court was careful not to contradict the well-established
proposition that dual loyalties are tolerated under ERISA.93
Rather, the court simply recognized that tolerance of those dual
loyalties does not extend to a fiduciary that jettisons its responsibil
ity to the physical well-being of beneficiaries in favor of "loyalty" to
its own financial interests. 94 "Tolerance, in other words, has its
limits. "95
In finding that Herdrich's amended Count III sufficiently al
leged defendants' breach of their ERISA fiduciary duties, the ma
jority gave no credence to the dissent's argument that only where
there is a "breakdown in the market" will there exist a possible
breach due to incentives. 96 Unlike the majority, the dissent relied
on market forces to protect against the potential negative effects of
incentive schemes, reasoning that plan sponsors would withdtaw
their support if they perceived any resulting detriment to the Plan
or its beneficiaries. 97 The majority, however, sufficiently undercut
the application of this market theory by reference to the facts in
Pegram. 98 Presumably due to the underlying incentive scheme,
Herdrich was forced to wait more than a week to receive the appro
priate diagnostic testing of the enlarged mass that Dr. Pegram dis
covered in her abdomen. 99 As a result of this delay, her appendix
ruptured and she suffered a life-threatening illness (peritonitis),
which necessitated a longer hospital stay and more serious surgery
at greater cost to both her and the Plan,loo If Cynthia Herdrich's
experience is even remotely representative, it is reasonable to con
clude that "market forces are insufficient to cure the deleterious
swayed to be most frugal when exercising their discretionary authority to the
detriment of their membership.
Id.
92. Id. at 373. The Seventh Circuit was very specific in stating that its decision
does not imply that the existence of incentives automatically creates a breach of fiduci
ary duty. Rather, the court held that incentives may give rise to a breach when the
complaint alleges, as in Pegram, that the fiduciary trust between plan participants and
plan fiduciaries has been broken. Id.
93. Id. (citing Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1981».
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 374.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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affects [sic] of managed care on the health care industry."101
3.

Depletion of the Plan's Assets Created a Cognizable
Loss

Herdrich's allegations that the defendants' incentive system
depleted plan resources for the benefit of the administering physi
cians, "possibly to the detriment of their patients," also survived a
motion to dismiss by the defendants. 102 The appeals court did not
resolve this issue, instead remanding it for the trial court to decide
whether the defendants breached their fiduciary duty to act only in
the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries. 103 The Seventh
Circuit opined, however, that plan participants' interests were prob
ably in conflict with the defendants' policy of depleting plan funds
with year-end bonus payouts. 104
( The Seventh Circuit believed that Herdrich's claim should not
be dismissed because her allegations clearly stated that the Plan had
suffered damages attributable to the defendants' breach. of their fi
duciary duty.1OS Under ERISA, a plan beneficiary may sue a plan
fiduciary for breach of duty.106 In such a suit, "plan beneficiaries
have standing to bring an action on behalf of the plan itself to
recoup monies· expended in violation of ERISA, as the plaintiff
[Herdrich] has done here."lo7 The ERISA fiduciary duty articu
lated in 29 U.S.c. § l109(a) applies to the Plan, and not to any sin
gle person. 1OB
The Seventh Circuit correctly concluded that the defendants
potentially breached their fiduciary duty to Herdrich. lo9 The
court's rationale for stating that the plan's assets are subject to pos
101. Id. at 374-75 (quoting various articles describing the mentality of doctors,
nurses, and the public toward profit-based health care).
102. Id. at 380. The ultimate issue of whether the defendants violated their fidu
ciary obligations to act solely in the interest of the Plan participants and beneficiaries
fell not within the jurisdiction ofthe Seventh Circuit, but instead within the jurisdiction
of the trial court. Id.
103. Id. at 380.
104. Id.
105. Id. "Herdrich alleges that as a result of the defendants' actions, the Plan was
deprived of.the supplemental medical e?,pense payment amounts in controversy. We
thus hold that she has alleged with sufficient clarity that the Plan suffered a loss as a
result of the defendants' actions." Id.
106. Id. (citing 29 U.S.c. § 1109(a) (1994».
107. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994».
108. Id. (citing Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 1992» ..
. 109. Pegram, 154 F.3d at 380 ("We conclude ... that the trial judge erred in
dismissing the plaintiff's amended Count III against the defendants for breach of fiduci
ary duty under ERISA.").
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sible misuse because they· are annually depleted by the HMO
owner-doctors is not clear, however, because the court fails to artic
ulate that the depletion process is a "poor business decision" when
inspired by substandard medical care.1 l0 Implicit in the Seventh
Circuit's rationale is the theory that a practice of providing ques
tionable medical services in order to increase profits places the Plan
assets at risk. This is because such practices are a reasonable, fore
seeable, and proximate cause of the Plan not being particularly
marketable to employers.1 11 The Herdrich complaint thus survived
a motion to dismiss because the HMO's incentive scheme contextu
ally created a reasonable "inference that. market forces have
failed ... to protect the interests"112 of beneficiaries under the Plan
to receive quality health care.

II.

REVERSAL OF FORTUNE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
AND ITS LEGACY

A.

Impact of the Judiciary's Preemption Theory on Managed
Care Issues under ERISA

Some commentators take the position that ERISA decisions
concerning the role of managed care organizations "simply do not
implicate the danger of judicial encroachment on legislative
power. "113 Congress intended for ERISA plan beneficiaries to be
compensated when injured by an HMO's economic decision-mak
ing process.H 4
. 110. Id. at 382 (Flaum, J., dissenting) ("In the long run, [denying valid claims]
would harm an insurer by inducing current customers to leave and by damaging its
chances of acquiring new customers. Thus, no conflict of interest exists because paying
meritorious claims is in [the insurer's] best interest.") (citing Mers v. Marriott InCI
Group Accidental Death & Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1020-21 (7th Cir.
1998».
111. Id. at 383 (Flaum, J., dissenting) ("[C)ourts have a role in ensuring that in
centives are implemented in accordance with the fiduciary duties imposed by ER
ISA .... [S]ponsors and beneficiaries need information about the financial incentives
that are in place. Thus, ... the failure to disclose financial incentives is a breach of
fiduciary duty under ERISA."); see Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
112. Pegram, 154 F.3d at 382. "[T]here is no guarantee that a sponsor will be able
to find satisfactory alternatives in the marketplace. The plaintiffs complaint, however,
alleges only that an incentive to deny coverage exists, which [does not] support an infer
ence that market forces have failed ... to protect the interests of beneficiaries." Id.
113. Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, Form Function and Managed Care
Torts: Achieving Fairness and Equity in ERISA Jurisprudence, 35 Hous. L. REv. 985,
1038 (1998). The Jacobson article articulates a number of compelling reasons why
courts should grant substantial justice to HMO beneficiaries by restricting ERISA pre
emption rationale. Id. at 1040-48.
114. Id. at 1039.
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The Supreme Court in Pegram cited to the Jacobson and Pom
fret article 115 and tentatively adopted its suggestion that courts use
a functional approach to hold managed care entities accountable
for economic and medical decisions under ERISA.1 16 Approaching
ERISA from a functional perspective allows one to view a court as
a pragmatic and functioning entityJ17 "[T]he judge steps into the
legislator's shoes, exercising the same sort of practical intelligence
that the legislator would have utilized had he or she foreseen the
situation. "118
The Supreme Court in Pegram held that ERISA preempts
state law claims for substandard medical care, relying on ERISA's
legislative history to support its conclusion that mixed eligibility
and treatment decisions are not fiduciary decisions.1 19 Since ER
ISA dominates medical treatment issues in this nation, it is impor
tant that the preemption issue be addressedPo Because of the lack
of express congressional intent, the preemption issue presented
under ERISA in the health care context is whether ERISA allows
HMOs to escape liability for providing negligent medical treat
ment.1 21 Simply stated, did Congress, by implication, intend ER
ISA to allow HMOs to make eligibility and treatment decisions
detrimental to patients because those decisions enhance the HMO's
financial position?122 A court holding that ERISA preempts state
law claims against substandard medical care provided by HMOs to
covered employee plan beneficiaries would assign to Congress a
mean-spirited intent "contrary to the law in all fifty states" which
protects people against unreasonable medical treatment.1 23 A real
istic judicial view of congressional intent toward HMOs supports
the conclusion that Congress intended for an HMO to be liable to
patient/plan beneficiaries when the HMO's economic interest is a
substantial factor in its decision to provide beneficiaries with unrea
sonable medical services or no medical treatment at aU.124
115. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 223 (2000).
116. Jacobson & Pomfret, supra note 113, at 987.
117. Id. at 995.
118. Id. at 995 nA9 (quoting Eric G. Zahnd, The Application of Universal Laws to
Particular Cases: A Defense of Equity in Aristotelians and Anglo-American Law, 59
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 269 (1996».
119. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 236-37.
120. Jacobson & Pomfret, supra note 113, at 987.
121. Id. at 988-89.
122. !d. at 995.
123. Id.
124. Id. ("As with any other business enterprise, MCOs [managed care organiza
tions] make economic decisions. These decisions will occasionally impose costs on ER
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Jacobson and Pomfret make an insightful and convincing argu
ment that the Supreme Court has committed significant error by
"its misinterpretation of ERISA's legislative history"125 in its pre
emption theory.126 They argue that the Court's treatment of ER
ISA's preemptive legislative history is flawed for three reasons: (1)
failure to consider ERISA's broad purposes, (2) failure to limit ER
ISA's preemption clause to ordinary field and conflict preemption,
and (3) mischaracterization of ERISA as an "intricate, comprehen
sive statute. "127
The first reason cited by Jacobson and Pomfret deals with the
Court's failure to follow the general rule of preemption analysis,
which provides that courts should interpret a statute in light of its
broader underlying policies. 128 In this context, the Court failed to
consider ERISA's policy of protecting the participants and benefi
ciaries of an employer sponsored health plan. 129 The Jacobson and
Pomfret article strongly disagreed with the view of commentators
that the plan and the employer, rather than individuals receiving
health care coverage, were the direct beneficiaries of the uniform
administration of health plans created by the Court's preemption
theory.1 30 Jacobson and Pomfret believe ERISA's legislative his
tory as well as the provisions of the statute outlining its policies
declare "unambiguously that the statute protects plan participants
and beneficiaries."l3l ERISA's legislative history appears to con
vincingly support those advocating that ERISA's uniformity goal
"and the preemption that achieves it, prevents employers and plans
from shifting higher administrative costs to employees and benefi
ciaries through reduced benefit levels."132
ISA plan participants. In addition, MCOs impose additional costs due to their
negligence. ").
125. Id. at 1008.
126. Id. at 1008-15.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1010.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1010-11.
131. Id. at 1011.
132. Id. (citing Seema R. Shah, Comment, Loosening ERISA's Preemptive Grip
on HMO Medical Malpractice Clams: A Response to Pacificare of Oklahoma v. Bur
rage, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1545, 1573 (1996)).
Contrary to the view taken by some, ERISA's goal of uniformity was not de
signed to protect employers, employee benefit plans, or plan fiduciaries. In
fact, ERISA bestowed the advantages of federal uniformity to ensure that em
ployers and employee benefit plans would not offset their administrative costs
onto vulnerable employee beneficiaries and their dependents. Regulatory
uniformity was the means to achieve the desired end of protecting employees.
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The second error in the Supreme Court's interpretation of ER
ISA's preemption legislative history is the mistaken conclusion that
ERISA preempts state laws regulating employer sponsored health
benefit plans even in the absence of a conflict because Congress has
not expressly or implicitly occupied the field.133 As a general rule,
when Congress exercises its enumerated power to create federal
legislation, the federal law usurps any parallel state law.13 4 When
there is conflict between the federal and state legislation, the
Supremacy Clause dictates that state law is inferior and must give
way to the superior federallaw. 135 In creating a law, Congress may
expressly decide to "occupy the field," thus disallowing correspond
ing state laws.13 6 Preemption issues are rarely presented in an un
ambiguous environment because Congress does not always clearly
articulate its purpose.137 Sometimes it may be merely implied that
Congress has occupied the field.138
The Court's preemption rationale for HMOs should be consis
tent with requiring HMOs to act in a way that protects the interest
of plan beneficiaries. 139 The Court could hold that since Congress
has not expressly or implicitly preempted state laws allowing for
traditional negligence actions against employer sponsored health
plans, traditional negligence remedies still exist. In the absence of
convincing evidence demonstrating a Congressional intent to over
ride traditional negligence remedies because of conflict, or a con
gressional desire to occupy the field in the managed care industry,
the Supreme Court should not presume that state negligence laws
do not apply to defendant HMOs.1 40 A healthy respect for the
principles of federalism makes it necessary for courts to construe
Given ERISA's purpose, HMOs should not receive ERISA's solicitude; any
special benefits arising from ERISA's regulatory control should be conferred
to the employee-participants of health care plans, not the ERISA-regulated
HMO plan. Preemption of malpractice claims would give HMOs a protective
benefit that disrupts ERISA's intended balanced protection.
Shah, supra, at 1573 (citations omitted).
133. Jacobson & Pomfret, supra note 113, at 1012.
134. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 347
(6th ed. 2000).
135. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Jacobson & Pomfret, supra note 113, at 1011 (declaring that the overriding
purpose of ERISA is to protect plan employee beneficiaries).
140. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 134, at 351 (citing Malone v. White
Motors Corp., 444 U.S. 911 (1979) and stating that the state statute relating to pensions
was not preempted by older federal law even though a new federal statute expressly
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ERISA against traditional state regulatory policies. 141
Congress, in its ambiguous ERISA preemptive debate, did not
intend to undermine federalism, according to Jacobson and Pom
fret. 142 It would threaten the spirit and rationale of Palsgraf v.
Long Island R.R. CO.143 to hold that HMOs do not have a duty to
use reasonable care toward plan beneficiaries because they were
unforeseeable victims of substandard medical treatment. 144 Justice
Cardozo said in Palsgraf that "the risk reasonably to be perceived
defines the duty to be obeyed."14s There is little doubt that an
HMO can foresee that, by communicating an excessive emphasis on
profits to its doctors, it creates an increased risk of doctors provid
ing plan beneficiaries, as a class, with substandard services. If man
aged care organizations do not owe a standard of due care to plan
beneficiaries, to whom is this duty owed?
As Justice Andrews said in his di~senting opinion in Palsgraf,
"Due care is a duty imposed on each one of us to protect society
from unnecessary danger, not to protect A,B, or C alone."146 Not
even in an election year would Congress be so irrational as to re
lieve HMOs of any legal liability for negligent conduct that is a sub
stantial factor in harming plan beneficiaries. "The proposition is
this: Everyone owes to the world at large the duty of refraining
from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of
others."147 When the unreasonable conduct of an HMO is a sub
stantial factor in creating a greater risk of harm to a plan benefici
ary, the managed care entity should be liable under the same tort
theories applicable to others that act unreasonably.1 48 If an HMO's
standard business practice places greater emphasis on saving money
provided for preemption). "In modem [preemption] decisions the Supreme Court has
refused either to presume or infer [Congressional] intent." Id. at 350.
141. Jacobson & Pomfret, supra note 113, at 992.
142. Id. at 992-93 (explaining that "courts have viewed state law as the relevant
backgrounds against which Congress legislated, an assumption that tends to limit the
scope of preemption and thereby respects federalism") (footnotes omitted).
143. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
144. Id. at 99 (describing how the the defendant railway's guard pushed a board
ing passenger and the passenger's package covered by a newspaper fell on the rails and
exploded, the shock of which threw down scales at the other end of the platform that
injured the plaintiff).
145. Id. at 100.
146. Id. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
148. Cf Hairston v. Alexander Tank & Equip. Co., 311 S.E.2d 559 (N.C. 1984)
(involving wrongful death action brought by deceased motorist's wife against an auto
mobile dealer and the driver of a flatbed truck, after truck struck and propelled a van
into the motorist's disabled vehicle and crushed the motorist to death).
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than on protecting and saving lives, the resulting harm to the bene
ficiary is not "so highly improbable and extraordinary an occur
rence" as to bear no reasonable connection to the HMO's original
negligence in advocating substandard medical treatmenP49
Even the court's mistaken conclusion that the legislative his
tory allows for a more expansive preemption than field and conflict
preemption 150 does not support relieving an HMO of liability un
less the connection between the HMO's negligence and the treating
doctor appears unnatural. 151
If the connection between negligence and the injury appears un

natural, unreasonable and improbable in the light of common ex
perience, the negligence, if deemed a cause of the injury at all, is
to be considered a remote rather than a proximate cause. It im
poses too heavy a responsibility for negligence to hold the tort
feasor responsible for what is unusual and unlikely to happen or
for what was only remotely and slightly probable. 152

A flawed expansive ERISA preemption theory which extends
beyond field and conflict preemption should not deny that states
have an important interest in holding managed care organizations
liable for negligent conduct. HMOs must be held responsible for
negligent conduct that is the natural, reasonable, and probable re
sult of a policy that places greater emphasis on profits than on the
quality of health care.
Jacobson and Pomfret state that ERISA's third legislative his
tory problem relates to the Court's false characterization of ERISA
as an "intricate comprehensive statute addressing employee health
plans and the preemption provision."153 When the Court character
izes ERISA legislation as intricate and comprehensive, it decides
that the "scheme warrants a cautious approach to inferring reme
dies not expressly authorized by the text."154 Any claim that ER
ISA is comprehensive with respect to employee health plans
149. Id. at 567-68.
150. Jacobson & Pomfret, supra note 113, at 1012.
151. Hairston, 311 S.E.2d at 567.
152. Id.
153. Jacobson & Pomfret, supra note 113, at 1013.
154. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 247
(2000). "But ERISA's 'comprehensive and reticulated' scheme warrants a cautious ap
proach to inferring remedies not expressly authorized by the text, especially given the
alternative and intuitively appealing interpretation, urged by Salomon, that § 502(a)(3)
authorizes suits only against defendants upon whom a duty is imposed by ERISA's
substantive provisions." Id. (citation omitted).
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mischaracterizes the statute.1 55 In legislative debates, Congress en
gaged in limited discussion about employee health plans, in com
parison to its exhausting and far-reaching debate concerning
employee pension plans. 156 This legislative history clearly suggests
that ERISA is not a comprehensive health plan statute but rather a
comprehensive pension statute. 157
Jacobson and Pomfret correctly postulate that "[t]he Court
seems to use its conclusion that ERISA is comprehensive with re
spect to health plans to legitimize its deregulation of health care via
preemption."158 If the Court had recognized that ERISA was not
comprehensive with respect to health plans, but was essentially a
pension statute, it might have been more hesitant to preempt so
much state health care regulation."159 It is clear that the Supreme
Court is hard pressed to justify a position that ERISA's comprehen
sive approach to pensions allows HMOs to be unregulated by states
for substandard medical care proximately caused by their negligent
health care policies toward plan beneficiaries. 16o
B.

Reasoning Behind ERISA's Preemption Rationale Rule
Threatens Traditional State Regulation of Health Care

Supreme Court decisions concerning which state laws are ap
propriately preempted under ERISA have been regarded as a fail
ure by both legal commentators and Justice Scalia. 161 The Court's
generous use of the preemption rationale in analyzing ERISA jeop
ardizes the states' ability to regulate health care, an area of tradi
tional state concern. 162 When the Court interprets ERISA so as to
deny a state the ability to regulate its own health care laws without
express preemption from Congress, it calls into question the Su
preme Court's basic commitment to federalist principles. 163 The
155. See Jacobson & Pomfret, supra note 113, at 1013-14.
156. Id.
157. Id. ("ERISA only regulates three aspects of health plans and leaves the re
mainder unregulated. Such minimal regulation is simply not comprehensive by any
stretch of the imagination.") (footnote omitted).
158. Id. (footnote omitted).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1009 (stating that "a court begins its preemption analysis with a deter
mination of whether Congress intended a particular area to go unregulated by the
states") (footnote omitted).
161. Id. at 1002 (citing Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham
Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 335-36 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring».
162. See id. at 1004.
163. Cf United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (2000) (holding a section
of the Violence Against Women Act unconstitutional by reasoning, in part, that Con
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Court's ERISA preemption theory is flawed because it precludes
states from providing established tort, contract, and fiduciary reme
dies for plan beneficiaries suffering from inadequate health care at
the hands of the managed care industry.1 64 It is at least debatable
whether Congress can expressly preempt state regulation of tradi
tional health care remedies. 165
The Supreme Court's federalism theory in Pegram is flawed
because the Court states that the federal courthouse doors could
not be opened to plan beneficiaries seeking a fiduciary malpractice
claim against an HMO without unequivocally opening state court
house doors to those asserting lack of reasonable care malpractice
claims. 166 The Court in Pegram should have simply declared that
because mixed eligibility and treatment decisions made by HMO
doctors are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA, the plaintiff Her
drich does not have a fiduciary claim. The Pegram Court should
have concluded that a plaintiff's right to establish a negligence mal
practice claim against an HMO and its physicians for mixed eligibil
ity and treatment decisions must be resolved in state court because
health care is "a subject oftraditional state regulation"167 which has
not been preempted.
C.

The Court Discusses ERISA's Fiduciary Standards for HMOs
Making Mixed Eligibility and Treatment Decisions

In Pegram, the Court held that mixed eligibility and treatment
decisions made by HMO doctors are not fiduciary acts under ER
ISA because Congress did not intend for the common law trustee
fiduciary standard to apply .to such decisions. 168 The Court finds
any extensive analogy between an ERISA fiduciary and a common
law trustee to be troublesome.1 69 Whereas the trustee at common
law characteristically wears only one fiduciary hat when he takes
action to affect a beneficiary, an ERISA trustee may wear different
hats such as being employer to the beneficiaries pO ERISA, how
gress might otherwise "obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national and
local authority").
164. Cf United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (holding that gun-free
school zones law was unconstitutional because it prohibited the state from exercising
judgment in an area traditionally regulated by the states).
165. See id.
166. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 234-37 (2000).
167. [d. at 237.
168. Id.
169. /d. at 225.
170.

Id.
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ever, requires its fiduciary to wear only one hat at a time, and to
"wear the fiduciary hat when making fiduciary decisions."17l ER
ISA allows an employer serving as a plan fiduciary to make a deci
sion adverse to an employee beneficiary, such as firing the
employee, only when the decision is not related to the ERISA
plan.172 Under ERISA an employer sponsoring a plan may modify
the terms of the plan by providing employees with fewer benefits
without breaching its ERISA fiduciary duties. 173 Thus, while super
ficially distinguishable, the fiduciary responsibilities owed under
both the common law and ERISA are substantively similar be
cause, in each case, the fiduciary is prohibited from acting in a man
ner that harms the beneficiary's interest. 174
The Court also found that Congress never intended for any
HMO to be treated as a fiduciary in making mixed eligibility and
treatment decisions.17 5 Exposing HMOs to financial liability for
their physicians' mixed eligibility and treatment decisions on a fidu
ciary duty theory would have an adverse impact on those HMOs
providing medical care for profit.17 6 Herdrich proposed as a rem
edy the return to the plan of profits gained by the HMO's owners as
a result of such mixed decisions. 177 To grant Herdrich this remedy,
in the Court's opinion, "would be nothing less than elimination of
the for-profit HMO"178 and "could portend the end of nonprofit
HMOs as well."179
The Court also noted that a refusal to dismiss Herdrich's com
plaint could destroy HMOs altogether and undermine Congress'
goal of allowing HMOs to make profits by assuming financial risks
171. Id. (citing Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 443-44 (1999);
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996)).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 227-28.
It will help to keep two sorts of arguably administrative acts in mind. What we
will call pure "eligibility decisions" turn on the plan's coverage of a particular
condition or medical procedure for its treatment. "Treatment decisions," by
contrast, are choices about how to go about diagnosing and treating a patent's
[sic] condition: given a patient's constellation of symptoms, what is the appro
priate medical response?
.
Id. (citations omitted).
176. Id. at 233.
177. Id. (citing 29 U.S.c. § 1l09(a) (1994) ("[R]eturn of all profits is an appropri
ate ERISA remedy.")).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 233 n.ll.
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for the provision of health care.1 80 The Court's opinion established
that it is not consistent with congressional intent "to translate fidu
ciary duty into a standard that would allow recovery from an HMO
whenever a mixed decision [is] influenced by the HMO's financial
incentive [and results] in a bad outcome for the patient."181 The
Supreme Court recognized that a "mixed decision made solely to
benefit the HMO or its physician would violate an ERISA fiduciary
duty."182 The Court noted, however, that the fiduciary standard ar
ticulated by Herdrich is far more restrictive by requiring "an eye
single" toward participants' interests.1 83 Thus, the Court rejected
Herdrich's standard,184 concluding that under her single-eye fiduci
ary requirement "every claim of fiduciary breach by an HMO phy
sician making a mixed decision would boil down to a malpractice
claim, and the fiduciary standard would be nothing but the malprac
tice standard traditionally applied in actions against physicians. "185
The fact that the HMO's defense would be that its physician acted
for good medical reasons led the Court to characterize the single
eye fiduciary standard as nothing but a pretext to federalize the
traditional medical malpractice standard. 186 The only value to plan
participants of such ERISA fiduciary litigation would be eligibility
for attorney's fees if their claims were successful.1 87 A doctor could
also "be subject to suit in federal court applying an ERISA stan
dard of reasonable medical skill."188 Allowing doctors to be sued
under that circumstance would appear to preempt a state malprac
tice claim, even though ERISA does not preempt such claims ab
sent a clear manifestation of congressional intent. 189
180. Id. at 233 ("[F]or over 27 years Congress has promoted the formation of
HMO practices. The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 allowed the forma
tion of HMOs that assume financial risks for the provision of health care services, and
Congress has amended the Act several times, most recently in 1996.") (citations
omitted).
181. Id. at 234.
182. Id. at 235.
183. Id. (citing Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982)).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 235-36 ("[I]n States that do not allow malpractice actions against
HMOs the fiduciary claim [offers] a further defendant to be sued for direct liability,
and ... the HMO might have a deeper pocket than the physician. But ... ERISA was
not enacted out of concern that physicians were too poor to be sued .... ").
187. Id. at 236.
188. !d.
189. Id. (citing N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Trav
elers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654-55 (1995)).
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CONCLUSION: CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND ERISA To
PUT PATIENTS BEFORE POCKETBOOKS

Those who believe that the marketplace will operate to main
tain an appropriate balance of power between patients' needs and
the corporate bottom line should remember this word of caution
from the Seventh Circuit's majority opinion in Pegram. Doctors,
and not insurance executives, are the experts in determining what is
best for their patients.1 9o Accordingly, only trained doctors, after
consultation with their patients, should be allowed to make deci
sions related to medical care.1 91 Unfortunately, however, modern
doctors are constrained by the bureaucracy, administration, and fi
nancial incentives associated with HMOs, which "overturn doctors'
decisions, deny treatment and then claim in court that they don't
practice medicine, only provide coverage, so that HMOs cannot be
sued for medical malpractice."192
The legislative history of ERISA simply does not clearly mani
fest intent to absolve HMOs and their physicians of negligent con
duct, which is a substantial factor in a beneficiary receiving
unreasonable medical care.1 93 In Corporate Health Insurance v.
Texas Department of Insurance,194 the Fifth Circuit held that ER
ISA does not preempt Texas law by allowing people to sue their
managed care health plans for malpractice for negligent treatment
decisions. 195 An HMO sued in federal district court to challenge a
Texas statute on ERISA preemption grounds. 196 The statute gives
potential plaintiffs a cause of action against HMOs that do not ex
ercise ordinary care in making their health care treatment deci
sions. 197 Judge Higginbotham said the Texas law does not
encompass claims based on an HMO's "denial of coverage for a
medical service recommended by the treating physician: that dis
pute is one over coverage ...."198 The provision in the Texas law,
however, permits "suit for claims that a treating physician was neg
190. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 377 (7th Cir. 1998).
191. Id. ("Medical care should not be subject to the whim of the new layer of
insurance bureaucracy now dictating the most basic, as well as the important, medical
policies and procedures from the boardroom.").
192. Id. at 378 (quoting Jamie Court, In Critical Condition: Holding HMOs Ac
countable for their Egregious Conduct, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 1998, at 13).
193. See Jacobson & Pomfret, supra note 113, at 1008-15.
194. 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000).
195. Id. at 534.
196. Id. at 53l.
197. Id. at 534.
198. Id.
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ligent in delivering medical services, and it imposes vicarious liabil
ity on managed care entities for that negligence."199 The provision
was determined to be valid and not preempted by ERISA.200 The
Corporate Health Insurance opinion conceded that a state law that
regulates an HMO in its administrative capacity is preempted under
ERISA.201 However, when HMOs are wearing their health care
providers' hats, they are subject to traditional state regulation of
the health care industry.202 The Fifth Circuit takes the position that
ERISA preemption applies when a doctor is making a coverage de
cision under the plan. 203 According to the court, however, the ER
ISA preemption rationale cannot insulate doctors from malpractice
claims and "accountability to their state licensing agency or associa
tion charged to enforce professional standards regarding medical
decisions."204 The Fifth Circuit properly concluded that Congress
did not intend "for ERISA to supplant ... [a] state['s] regulation of
the quality of medical practice. "205 States are only using their tradi
tional police power in regulating the quality of health care treat
ment decisions. 206 "A suit for medical malpractice against a doctor
is not preempted by ERISA simply because those services were ar
ranged by an HMO and paid for by an ERISA plan."207
Congressional failure to make it completely clear that ERISA
199. Id.
200. Id. at 535.
201. Id. at 534.
202. Id.
203. Id.
. 204. Id. at 534-35.
205. Id. at 535.
.T he Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits have held that medical negligence
claims against HMOs for vicarious and direct liability are not within the scope
of § 502(a) and, therefore, are not completely preempted because they involve
conduct by the HMO in its capacity as a provider and arranger of health ser
.
vices and not as plan administrator.
Id. at 535 n.25; see Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 646 (7th Cir. 1995) (vicarious claims);
Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 1995) (vicarious and direct
claims); Lupo v. Human Affairs Int'!, Inc., 28 F.3d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1994) (direct
claims).
For federal district courts allowing suit for vicarious liability, see Yanez v. Humana
Medical Plan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 1314, 1316 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Ray v. Value Behavioral
Health, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 417,423-24 (D. Nev. 1997); Schachter v. PacifiCare of Okla.,
Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1448, 1451 (N.D. Okla. 1995); Chaghervand v. CareFirst, 909 F. Supp.
304,311 (D. Md. 1995); Smith v. HMO Great Lakes, 852 F. Supp. 669, 671-72 (N.D. III.
1994).
206. Corporate Health Ins., 215 F.3d at 535.
207. Id. ("Likewise, the vicarious liability of the entities for whom the doctor
acted as an agent is rooted in general principles of state agency law. Seen in this light,
the Act simply codifies Texas's already-existing standards regarding medical care.").
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does not preempt traditional state health law claims against HMOs
leaves many, including doctors, to seek a judicial solution through
creative litigation. In March 2001, three state medical associations
representing doctors filed a lawsuit accusing HMOs of engaging in a
pattern of racketeering activity to deny necessary medical care. 208
A representative of one of these state medical associations said
"[w]e felt we had to go to the courthouse to force the companies to
respect the patient-doctor relationship. "209
When an HMO's conduct is a substantial factor in beneficiaries
receiving substandard medical treatment, basic principles of feder
alism require Congress to protect the states from federal judicial
encroachment created by Congress' own ambiguity with regard to
ERISA's preemption intent. Either Congress or the Supreme
Court should clarify that Congress did not intend for ERISA to
allow HMOs to escape liability for negligent health care treatment
decisions that proximately cause a plaintiff's injury. The Supreme
Court should hold that HMOs might be held liable for any conduct
that unreasonably interferes with the provision of medical services
to an ERISA beneficiary because Congress did not intend to deny
state law tort remedies to employees needing medical services.
Only the Court's failure to properly understand ERISA's legislative
history precludes it from finding that HMOs may be defendants for
unreasonably interfering with the delivery of health care to covered
employees. This congressional ambiguity demonstrates a lack of
political will and is itself political negligence. Patients and doctors
continue to suffer because of HMOs' preoccupation with profits.
Congress must end this suffering by enacting legislation that will
clearly allow states to hold HMOs accountable for substandard care
under state tort law. Congress should not continue to ignore pleas
from patients and doctors alike to recognize that an HMO owes a
duty of reasonable care to covered beneficiaries-a duty to ensure
they receive services doctors believe are medically necessary with
out regard to financial profit.

208. See Milt Freudenheim, Doctors Insist HMOs Pay Up: Suits Cite Conspiracy
to Cut Costs, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 27, 2001, at AI, available at 2001 WL 3008836 (dis
cussing the lawsuit filed by the Texas Medical Association and similar groups against
eight health insurers alleging that the insurers intentionally delayed or denied payments
to doctors in violation of civil racketeering and other laws).
209. Id.

